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Abstract
Instead of attacking their adversaries directly, states often do so indirectly by sup-
porting rebel groups. While these support relationships vary considerably, existing
research lacks a comprehensive account thereof. To explain states’ choice of sup-
port, we suggest differentiating between two modes of support relationships
according to the control opportunities they offer states over rebels: while delega-
tion enables “hands-on” control, “hands-off” orchestration allows for plausible
deniability and does not harm rebels’ local legitimacy. We argue that sponsors prefer
orchestration when “hands-on” control can be substituted by goal alignment or
competition; and they prefer delegation when the conflict is highly salient. Tests
using global data for the period 1975-2009 support the first two expectations.
Surprisingly, states’ capabilities also render “hands-off” orchestration more likely.
The paper advances the understanding of external rebel support by transferring
insights from indirect governance theory to the study of indirect wars and putting it
to statistical test.
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Rather than attacking other states directly, governments often rely on indirect warfare
by supporting a rebel group’s fight against an adversarial government (Salehyan 2010,
494).1 Take as examples the Russian government’s support for the separatists in
Eastern Ukrainian against their central government (Rauta 2016) as well as the United
States (US) government’s sponsorship of Kurdish rebels inter alia against the Assad
government in Syria (Byman 2013, 906-7; Cragin 2015). Indeed, while direct war
between states has become rare, the fight between factions within states has been the
dominant type of conflict since 1945 (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016), with
roughly half of rebel groups receiving external support by foreign governments (D. E.
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013, 527; San-Akca 2017).
Research therefore increasingly focuses on indirect warfare (Byman 2005, 2013;
San-Akca 2009; Bapat 2012; Belgioiso 2018; Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017;
Karlén 2017; Tamm 2016; Petrova 2019; Krieg and Rickli 2019). A growing strand of
this research draws on Principal Agent (PA) Theory and conceptualizes indirect war-
fare as “textbook example” (Hovil and Werker 2005, 25) of delegation, whereby
“external actors play an important role in shaping the insurgency and exert control
over it” (Salehyan 2010, 501; cf. Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and
Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; Salehyan 2010; Szekely 2016;
Popovic 2017; Rauta 2016). In a PA logic, sponsors should generally aim to supervise
rebels’ fulfilment of delegated tasks as strictly as possible to avoid agency slack. States
are thus expected to “delegate to rebels [ . . . ] when they can effectively monitor agent
activities and sanction bad behaviour” (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011,
711). The lack of such “hands-on” control is then explained by a sponsor’s incap-
ability to provide effective supervision and generally conceived as “weak and
problematic” (Byman and Kreps 2010, 9; cf. Salehyan 2010, 505).
While this scholarship has advanced our understanding of indirect warfare con-
siderably, it cannot fully account for the empirical variety of indirect warfare. In line
with its expectations, we indeed observe instances where states closely control
sponsored rebels. They thereby rely on “hands-on” control instruments such as the
employment of troops on the ground to train the rebels or monitor their compliance,
as well as the provision of sanctuaries on their own territory which allows for
sanctioning rebels in case of non-compliance. For instance, the US retained a high
degree of control through providing Syrian rebels with training and deploying mil-
itary personnel on the ground (Byman 2013, 996). However, we also observe numer-
ous instances where highly capable states refrained from using such “hands-on”
control instruments. For example, Russia—a great power far from being militarily
incapable—provided the rebels in East Ukraine with armaments without applying
hierarchical controls (Rauta 2016, 97) and the US similarly mainly relied on finan-
cial aid to assist the Contras in Nicaragua (Hoekstra 2021). The question is thus:
Why do state sponsors sometimes opt for “hands-on” controls when supporting rebel
groups and refrain from them at other times?
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To solve this puzzle, this paper draws on and adds to the emerging literature on
indirect governance (Abbott et al. 2016, 2020a, 2020b), and puts it to an empirical
test in the realm of indirect warfare. We develop our theoretical argument in two
steps. In a first step, we differentiate two modes of support relationships in indirect
wars (second section): (i) delegation, where a sponsor can exert “hands-on” control
over a rebel group; and (ii) orchestration, where a sponsor takes a “hands-off”
approach and can only steer rebels by inducements.2 The sponsor’s varying control
over rebels results in specific benefits and limitations of the two modes. Delegation
allows for the hierarchical control of rebels’ compliance but constrains rebels’
opportunity to build and preserve their local legitimacy—a valuable asset in indirect
warfare—as well as sponsors’ opportunity to plausibly deny their support, putting
them at risk of domestic and international backlash. Orchestration, in turn, allows
sponsors to profit from rebels’ local legitimacy as well as plausible deniability but
lacks the “hands-on” control instruments to enforce rebels’ compliance. More con-
trol thus is not always better, but state sponsors face a trade-off when choosing
between orchestration and delegation.
In the second step, we then theorize how this manifestation of the “governor’s
dilemma” (Abbott et al. 2020a, 2020b) shapes state sponsors’ choice between
orchestration and delegation (third section). We hypothesize that a sponsor willingly
opts for “hands-off” orchestration when its downside—the lack of hierarchical con-
trol—can be alleviated by supporting a group with aligned goals, based on shared
ethnic ties (goal alignment thesis), or a market mechanism, enabled through multiple
rebel groups (supply thesis). On the contrary, a sponsor prefers “hands-on” delega-
tion—and thus hierarchical control over a rebel group—, when the conflict is highly
salient due to long-term rivalry with the target state (saliency thesis).
To test these hypotheses, we employ time-series cross-section logistic regression
models with global data for the years 1975 to 2009 (fourth section). In line with our
theoretical expectations, we find that sponsors are more likely to orchestrate a rebel
group when they share common ethnic ties or when they can choose between
multiple groups. In contrast, the evidence for sponsors opting for delegation when
targeting long-term rivals is suggestive at best. Our results also yield important
implications for future research (fifth section). In contrast to common assumptions
in both the literature on indirect governance and rebel support, a sponsor’s capabil-
ities make delegation less—not more—likely and state sponsors’ choice between
orchestration and delegation remains remarkably stable—and not unstable—over
time. The conclusion (sixth section) summarizes our contributions to the literatures
on indirect governance as well as rebel support.
Two Modes of Indirect Wars: Delegation and Orchestration
To conceptualize the varieties of support relationships in indirect wars, we draw on
the indirect governance framework (see Abbott et al. 2016, 2020a, 2020b) and
differentiate between “hands-on” delegation and “hands-off” orchestration in rebel
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support.3 This enables us to structure important insights of the rebel support liter-
ature while going beyond its conceptual focus on delegation.
Delegation
In delegation relationships, sponsors use “hands-on” control instruments to ensure
the rebels’ compliance. When an external support relationship takes the mode of
delegation, the sponsor can shape a rebel group in line with its goals or even create it
in the first place; and the sponsor can use coercive means to ensure the rebels’
compliance. State sponsors can exercise ex ante control by manipulating rebels’
preference structure via socialization. They can influence the rebels’ identities by
subjecting rebel leaders to long training and indoctrination (see Salehyan 2010, 505;
Byman and Kreps 2010, 10-11; see also, Hoover Green 2016). In addition, sponsors
can rely on ex post control by supervising rebels’ execution of delegated tasks and
sanctioning potential slack (Byman and Kreps 2010, 10-12; Salehyan 2010, 502). A
sponsor can send counselors to the rebels that closely monitor their behavior (and
possibly also entail socializing effects). If rebels slack, the sponsor can use coercive
force to compel them into compliance. It might (threaten to) remove its forces on the
ground or expel rebels from safe havens on the sponsor’s territory. Its threats of
punishment are also more credible as the sponsor is aware of the rebels’ location
(Byman and Kreps 2010, 10-11; Salehyan 2010, 506). Overall, the sponsor is in a
strong position as it can take away the provided support. While the sponsor might
provide additional material or immaterial support, it is thus always able to use both
carrots and sticks. Hence, if indirect warfare follows the logic of “hands-on” delega-
tion, the sponsor provides training or sanctuaries for the insurgents, or military
support using its own personnel on the ground. Take as an example the support
relationship between Rwanda and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
(RCD) in Congo-Kinshasa. The RCD relied on heavy material and troop support by
Rwanda throughout its existence and operated under the supervision of the Rwandan
army. This support resulted in the group achieving substantive military success in
line with Rwandan goals (Reyntjens 2001; Tull 2003; Stearns 2013).
Delegation thus provides a sponsor with information about a rebel groups’ fulfil-
ment of the delegated tasks and means of sanction if this is not the case. Yet,
hierarchical control also comes with limitations immanent to its visibility.
“Hands-on” control of rebels allows for public responsibility attributions to the
sponsor by international or domestic observers (see Schwarzenbeck 2017; Kruck
2020; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2021). Domestically, particularly in the case of
atrocities and human losses, this might lead to protests and the punishment of the
government in the voting booth (Mumford 2013). Internationally, this might trigger
sanctions against this breach of international law or legitimate direct military reta-
liation by the targeted state and its allies. Furthermore, clearly visible foreign influ-
ence is often seen as illegitimate by the local population (Tamm 2020). A rebel
group that is perceived as an agent of foreign interests might thus lose local
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legitimacy. This likely decreases the rebels’ capacity to effectively fight the gov-
ernment (Salehyan 2010, 504, 506; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011,
713-14). Again, take as an example the support of the government of Rwanda to
the RCD. The visible foreign involvement by Rwanda led to an international back-
lash against Kigali as well as the rebel group being perceived as an instrument of
Rwandan occupation by most of the local population (Reyntjens 2001; Tull 2003;
Stearns 2013).
Orchestration
In orchestration relationships, a sponsor enlists an autonomous rebel group by agree-
ing on the execution of certain tasks in return for their support. The sponsor does not
shape rebels ex ante but enlists an independent rebel group that agrees on cooperat-
ing in return for support. The sponsor lacks “hands-on” control instruments and
therefore can only nudge rebels in the preferred direction. In the absence of coercive
means to compel rebels into compliance, a sponsor can only influence rebels ex post
by means of conditionality. It can make demands in exchange for further strengthen-
ing rebels’ operational abilities through material, financial, or informational support
(see Byman and Kreps 2010, 10; Salehyan 2010, 506). Compared to delegation
relationships, the sponsor is in a weaker position as it cannot take away the support
once handed over even when rebels slack. In other words, the sponsor can only use
carrots but lacks a stick. Moreover, the sponsor might not even be aware of rebels’
slacking in the first place, as it cannot monitor their activities. In the absence of
“hands-on” control, a sponsor can never be sure that rebels will act in line with its
goals (see Byman and Kreps 2010, 6-8; Salehyan 2010, 495, 504). Thus, if indirect
warfare follows the logic of “hands-off” orchestration, a sponsor solely provides
material and/or immaterial support while refraining from hierarchical control instru-
ments. Take as an example the support relationship between the Sudanese govern-
ment and the rebels in its neighbor country South Sudan. The insurgents received
less visible support in the form of weapons from Khartoum, allowing them to use
local grievances for recruitment. The Sudanese government could deny any invol-
vement while achieving its aim of distracting Juba from the dispute over the shared
border (Small Arms Survey 2012; Todisco 2015).
In consequence, a sponsor can, firstly, tap into the benefits from rebels’ local
legitimacy among (parts of) the population that likely advances the war effort. A
rebel group that is not under the hierarchical control of an external supporter is less
likely perceived as an agent of foreign interests (see Salehyan 2010, 504, 506;
Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, 713-14; Tamm 2020).4 Moreover,
“hands-off” orchestration allows a sponsor to operate on the basis of plausible
deniability. As rebels are more autonomous, sponsors can avoid responsibility attri-
butions for, for example, human rights violations (see Schwarzenbeck 2017; Kruck
2020; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2021) and are in a better position to plausibly deny
their involvement (see Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl 2020). This diminishes the risk
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of both domestic and international backlashes (see Bapat 2012, 1-2; Borghard 2014,
7; Byman and Kreps 2010, 6, 9; Mumford 2013, 44; Salehyan 2010, 503-4; Saleh-
yan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, 713). However, the lack of hierarchical
control also comes with endogenous limitations. Orchestrators lack the instruments
to warrant information about the rebels’ actions and to sanction them if they use the
received resources to engage in non-compliant behavior. For instance, rebels can sell
their equipment or use the received resources for their own objectives that might
contradict the sponsor’s preferences (see Byman and Kreps 2010, 6-12; Salehyan
2010, 495, 504-6; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011, 714-15; Salehyan,
Siroky, and Wood 2014, 638; Popovic 2017, 3-4; Rauta 2016, 93). The support
relationship between Sudan and the South Soudanese rebels is again illustrative.
The rebels used these weapons against Khartoum’s goals by employing them not
only against the government of South Sudan but also against opposing ethnic groups.
Against the Sudanese government’s objectives, this intensified communal strife in
South Sudan (Small Arms Survey 2012; Todisco 2015). Table 1 summarizes orches-
tration and delegation as two modes of rebel support along with their specific
benefits and limitations.
Explaining State Sponsors’ Choice between Orchestration
and Delegation
To explain why state sponsors opt for orchestration or delegation in indirect warfare,
we start from the standard rational choice assumption that self-interested actors aim
at maximizing their utility. As “hands-on” delegation and “hands-off” orchestration
yield specific benefits and limitations, state sponsors are confronted with a trade-off
when choosing between these two modes. The situation where a governor can either
obtain hierarchical control over an intermediary or tap into specific benefits by
refraining from control was coined as the “governor’s dilemma” (Abbott et al.
Table 1. Two Modes of Indirect Warfare.
Delegation Orchestration
Mode “Hands-on” control due to training,
provision of sanctuaries, logistic or
military support
“Hands-off” control due to purely
material or immaterial support
without attached controls
Benefit Rebels’ compliance due to monitoring
and sanctioning instruments
Sponsors’ plausible deniability and
rebels’ intact local legitimacy due to
the lower visibility of the support
relationship
Limitation Responsibility attribution to sponsors
and erosion of rebels’ local legitimacy
due to the higher visibility of the
support types
Rebels’ non-compliance due to the lack
of monitoring and sanctioning
instruments
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2020a, 2020b). Drawing on this recent research on indirect governance, we hold that
state sponsors’ choice between delegation and orchestration is shaped by the trade-
off between greater hierarchical control over rebels’ compliance vs. benefits stem-
ming from the rebels’ relative independence, that is, local legitimacy and plausible
deniability. We derive from this literature three independent variables that shape
sponsors’ cost-benefit calculation between the two modes of indirect warfare.
Firstly, selecting rebels with converging goals is a beneficial alternative to their
hierarchical control (see Abbott et al. 2016, 2020a, 2020b).5 We expect a sponsor’s
fear of rebels’ non-compliance to be significantly diminished by shared ethnic ties.
While aligned goals between a rebel group and a sponsor might stem from a diver-
sity of sources (Rauta 2018; San-Akca 2016), ethnic ties between a sponsor and a
rebel group indicate shared or at least compatible goals in many conflict settings (see
Saideman 1997, 2001, 2002; Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Cederman, Girardin, and
Gleditsch 2009; Cederman et al. 2013; Salehyan 2010, 505; Byman and Kreps 2010,
5). Ethnic ties might also provide both parties with information about each other.
They can thus substitute hierarchical monitoring instruments by serving as a base of
mutual trust and cooperation (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Larson and Lewis 2017). As
a result, ethnic ties can mitigate the risks of rebels’ non-compliance given the lack of
hierarchical controls. The Indian government’s initial support for the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is illustrative of how shared ethnic ties can substitute
the need for “hands-on” control. With India having its own Tamil population, the
Indian government was committed to LTTE’s goal of ending violence against the
Tamils in Sri Lanka. At the beginning of the conflict, the Indian government only
provided material and financial support (Groh 2010, 149, 170-1). Ethnic ties might
thus substitute a sponsor’s need of employing hierarchical “hands-on” controls and
allow the sponsor to tap into the benefits provided by an independent rebel group and
thus engage in “hands-off” orchestration.
Hypothesis 1: Sponsors are more likely to orchestrate when they share ethnic
ties with a rebel group (goal alignment thesis).
Secondly, a sponsor values the benefits of orchestration over the benefits of
delegation when “hands-on” controls can be substituted by a market mechanism
(see Abbott et al. 2016, 2020a, 2020b; Biermann and Rittberger 2020). When a
government has the choice to (potentially) support an alternative rebel group, the
competition between multiple rebel groups provides a sponsor with extensive con-
trol in the absence of “hands-on” control instruments.6 When more than one group
rebels against their government, they compete for the limited resources of the
sponsor. Every rebel group therefore has an incentive to report their competitors’
non-compliant behavior to the sponsor to gain an advantage. Furthermore, a spon-
sor’s threats of withdrawing support as a sanction in case of non-compliance are
more credible when alternative rebel groups are available since this renders a spon-
sor independent from a single group (Byman and Kreps 2010, 11). The case of the
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Syrian government supporting the Palestinian cause in the 1970s and 1980s illus-
trates how the competition between multiple rebel groups substitutes hierarchical
controls by the sponsor. Syria was able to choose between competing Palestinian
armed groups enabling them to counter non-compliance while it refrained from more
“hands-on” control instruments on the ground. Moreover, Syria shifted its support
between different groups as a sanction instrument and even pitted groups against
each other to fuel competition (Byman 2005, 132-38). Competition between multi-
ple rebel groups thus substitutes “hands-on” hierarchical controls by the sponsor,
who can then tap into the benefits of “hands-off” orchestration.
Hypothesis 2: Sponsors are more likely to orchestrate when the number of
rebel groups is high (supply thesis).
We expect a sponsor to enjoy the benefits of a looser, “hands-off” relationship
with a rebel group when hierarchical “hands-on” control can be substituted by goal
alignment or competition. However, we also agree with the existing literature on
rebel support that the utility of “hands-on” delegation can outweigh the utility of
“hands-off” orchestration. We, thirdly, posit that a sponsor values greater hierarch-
ical control over the benefits of orchestration when the conflict is highly salient for it
(Abbott et al. 2016, 726). This is the case when a strong rivalry exists between the
sponsor and the targeted government (see Maoz and San-Akca 2012). When fighting
a long-time rival, the achievement of the sponsor’s strategic goals—independent of
their concrete substance—might be too important to risk non-compliance by the
rebels. Moreover, given a history of conflict with an adversary, plausible deniability
might not be sustainable either way—and not even desirable in some cases.7 Rwan-
dan support to the RCD illustrates how high conflict saliency between the support
and the target state renders plausible deniability infeasible. The group’s formation
came shortly after strong friction between Kigali and the Congolese government it
had helped put in power only months before, which resulted in Rwandan troops
being expelled from the DRC. Rwanda had a strong interest in seeing its renegade
ally toppled but also would have had a very hard time denying its involvement in any
kind of uprising in the eastern DRC given the recent events (Stearns 2013). In highly
salient conflicts, sponsors thus prefer “hands-on” control of rebels to enforce com-
pliance over the benefits of “hands-off” orchestration.
Hypothesis 3: Sponsors are less likely to orchestrate when a strong rivalry
exists between the sponsor and the target government (saliency thesis).
To sum up, we suggest three independent variables that shape a sponsor’s choice
between orchestration and delegation. We hypothesize that a sponsor values the
hierarchical control enabled by “hands-on” delegation more than the benefits of
orchestration when the conflict is highly salient for it. Conversely, a sponsor prefers
to tap into the benefits of “hands-off” orchestration, that is, local legitimacy and
plausible deniability, when hierarchical controls can be substituted by goal
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alignment, based on shared ethnic ties, or a market mechanism, enabled through the
availability of multiple rebel groups.
Researching Orchestration and Delegation in Indirect Wars
To test our theoretical propositions, we employ the UCDP External Support Data-
set. In line with our definition of indirect warfare as instances where a third-party
government (i.e., the sponsor) intentionally supports a rebel group in its fight
against its government (cf. Loveman 2002, 30; Salehyan 2010, 494; Mumford
2013, 11), it includes information on the external sponsorship of warring parties,
that is, “support that is actively given to strengthen the party in the particular
conflict” (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011, 5). It covers the period
1975-2009 and indicates what specific types of support these parties received.
We therefore chose the UCDP data over another recent dataset compiled by
San-Akca (2016), whose wider definition of external support also comprises
instances where a state unintentionally supports a rebel group which “manages
to acquire these resources within [the state’s] borders by its own means and
efforts” (San-Akca 2016, 25). However, as San-Akca’s Dangerous Companions
Dataset covers more years, we use it to check the robustness of our results with an
alternative data source and across an extended period.
Our dependent variable measures the occurrence of the two modes of support
relationships in indirect wars: (i) delegation, where sponsors can hierarchically
control the rebels by supervising the execution of delegated tasks on the ground;
and (ii) orchestration, where sponsors lack “hands-on” control instruments but can
nudge the rebels in the preferred direction by providing material, financial, or
informational support. For the purpose of this paper, we relied on the provided
support as an indicator for a sponsor’s control opportunities. We code a dummy
variable where delegation equals 0 and orchestration equals 1 based on the specific
goods or services provided by state actors to a rebel group. We coded a year as
orchestration when a sponsor only provided weapons, funding, intelligence, or
“logistic goods”8 since hierarchical control over these goods is relinquished when
handed over. We coded a year as delegation when at least one of the forms of support
allows for a sponsor’s hierarchical control. Support types featuring hierarchical
control opportunities are the provision of troops, training, as well as access to the
sponsor’s territory (i.e., safe havens) or its military infrastructure. We hold each of
these support forms sufficient to code the whole year as delegation. Thus, instances
of delegation always comprise at least one of the support types listed above. Only in
the absence of these support types, a year was coded as orchestration. Figure 1
summarizes the support types necessary for orchestration and those sufficient for
delegation.
Taken together, we arrive at 391 distinct support-dyads and 1.502 instances in the
years 1975 to 2009 where states supported rebel groups in another country either via
orchestration or delegation9; 133 support-dyads were continuously orchestrated, 218
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were continuously delegated, and forty experienced change in the support mode
during the period of observation. Figure 2 shows that the share of orchestration
varies considerably over time but became less prominent after the Cold War.
To understand why in some instances sponsors delegate whereas in others they
orchestrate, we run a Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) logit analysis using the
sufficient for
UCDP support types and code
• Troops (secondary warring party) (X); or
• Training/Expertise (T); or
• Access to Territory (L); or
• Access to military infrastructure (Y)
UCDP support types and code
• Weapons (W); or
• Materiel/Logistics (M); or
• Funding ($); or
• Intelligence Material (I)
necessary for
Delegation Orchestration
Figure 1. Support types necessary for orchestration or sufficient for delegation. Note: We
coded two dummy variables based on UCDP External Support Dataset; “unknown types” (O)
and “other types” (U) were coded as missing.
Figure 2. Support modes across time (1975–2009).
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delegation-orchestration dummy as dependent variable.10 We operationalized the
independent variables of our theoretical model as follows:
 Ethnic ties (H1): To measure ethnic ties, we rely on the Ethnic Power Rela-
tions data (Vogt et al. 2015). We first matched rebel groups to the ethnic
groups they claim to fight for using the ACD2EPR data. Then, we identified
the international kinship links of these groups and of those living in a sponsor
using the TEK data. Finally, we used this information to create a dummy
indicating whether the ethnic group a rebel group claims to fight for is also
politically relevant in the sponsor state. The dummy takes the value 1 if such
co-ethnicity exists and 0 if not.
 Number of rebel groups (H2): To count how many groups other than the
supported one were fighting the target government in the previous year of the
same armed conflict, we used the UCDP Dyadic Conflict Data (Harbom,
Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).
 Rivalry (H3): For the existence of a rivalry, we used a dummy indicating
whether the sponsor and target state were parties to a rivalry in the previous
year, taken from version 5.20 of the rivalry dataset by Klein, Goertz, and
Diehl (2006).
To account for the common claim that the lack of “hands-on” control in support
relationships is due to the weakness of a sponsor, we also include measures of
sponsors’ capabilities. We examine two attributes, namely their financial as well
as military endowments. Financial capabilities are measured using sponsors’ GDP,
taken from version 6.0 beta of the trade and GDP data by Gleditsch (2002, 2013). We
measure military capabilities with their military expenditures taken from the Corre-
lates of War (CoW) National Material Capabilities Data Version 5.0 (Singer, Bre-
mer, and Stuckey 1972). To attenuate the influence of extreme values, we log both
variables as is common in existing research.
We also control for several potential confounders that may reasonably affect the
probability of orchestration while also being correlated with one or more of our main
independent variables. First, we control for direct contiguity between the sponsor
and target state as it should increase sponsors’ ability to project power and thus to
use hierarchical controls. We include a dummy indicating whether support and
target state share a border, taken from Version 3.2 of the CoW Contiguity data
(Stinnett et al. 2002). Second, the sponsor’s regime type may play a role as democ-
racies may be more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than autocracies
(Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014). We used the Polity IV data (Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers 2016) to code a categorical indicator of a sponsor being autocratic (Polity
score  7), anocratic (Polity score > 7 and < 7) or democratic (Polity score  7)
and included it as indicator variable with autocracy being the base category. Third,
the sponsor’s governmental capacity may also affect the support relationship (Bor-
ghard 2014, 68). More specifically, when the government of the sponsor fears a coup
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by its own military, this may affect whether it orders it to apply hierarchical controls
on the supported rebel group (Tamm 2016). We thus included an indicator of coup
risk in terms of civil-military relations based on Belkin and Schofer (2003), taking
into account whether a country experienced a coup in the previous ten years, its
regime legitimacy, and the strength of its civil society. Fourth, we included a dummy
for post-1989 years as Figure 1 indicates that orchestration may have been more of a
Cold War phenomenon. Finally, a rebel group’s number of sponsors may affect the
sponsors’ choice of support mode as it affects the groups vulnerability toward
sanctions (see also, Kruck 2020), leading us to include the number of sponsors as
coded based on the UCDP External Support Data.11
Empirical Analysis
We test our hypotheses by running four main models (see Table 2). The dependent
variable is a dummy indicating whether a support relationship takes the form of
delegation or orchestration. We employ logistic regression models to examine its
determinants. To account for time dependency, they include cubic polynomials of
the time between the last orchestration event and the current observation.
Model 1 includes all variables discussed above but covers the shortest period of
observation, 1975 to 2000. Model 2 extend this period to 2002 by excluding the—
previously insignificant—variable civil-military relations. Models 3 and 4 further
increase the number of observations by respectively dropping the rivalry dummy and
the lagged number of rebel groups. Please note that the number of observations is
higher for Model 4 than Model 2 despite covering the same period. The reason is that
Model 2 includes the lagged number of rebel groups as a predictor, resulting in all
observations that occurred in the first year of a conflict being dropped as there is no
such information about other rebel groups for them. As both Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) exhibit the lowest
values for Model 112, we use it as our main model for computing substantive effect
values.
The results corroborate our theoretical model. As expected, ethnic ties (H1)
between a sponsor and a receiving rebel group increase the likelihood of orchestra-
tion as the dummy has a positive and statistically significant effect in all four
models. Also corresponding to our expectations, orchestration becomes more likely
to occur as the number of groups (H2) fighting in a conflict increases. This effect is
again statistically significant in all models. The effect of rivalry (H3) on orchestra-
tion is negative, but varies substantially in terms of its significance across models.
Furthermore, we also find the effect of military capabilities to be stably significant.
However, it turns out to be positive while the rebel support literature suggested a
negative relationship: great capabilities of the sponsor make orchestration more
likely. Regarding the control variables, only direct contiguity has a statistically
significant effect which is negative.
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Table 2. Results of the Four Models.
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Orchestration 1975–2000 1975–2002 1975–2009 1975–2002
Ethnic Ties 1.490*** 0.870** 0.725** 0.757***
(4.098) (2.356) (2.182) (2.701)
Number of Rebel Groups (lag) 0.172** 0.166*** 0.138**
(2.442) (2.803) (2.428)
Rivalry (lag) 0.999*** 0.572* 0.476*
(2.872) (1.811) (1.732)
Military Expenditures (ln) 0.392** 0.394*** 0.371*** 0.440***
(2.359) (2.784) (2.779) (3.693)
GDP (ln) 0.032 0.150 0.141 0.184
(0.192) (0.948) (0.942) (1.321)
Controls
Two Sponsors 0.645 0.480 0.645 0.131
(1.204) (0.991) (1.464) (0.351)
Three or Four Sponsors 0.132 0.008 0.153 0.444
(0.326) (0.022) (0.462) (1.406)
More than Five Sponsors 0.094 0.191 0.220 0.278
(0.235) (0.504) (0.623) (0.854)
Shared Border 0.798** 0.709** 1.092*** 0.602*
(2.312) (1.998) (4.023) (1.955)
Sponsor: Anocracy 0.344 0.023 0.191 0.070
(0.999) (0.068) (0.611) (0.225)
Sponsor: Democracy 0.699 0.178 0.318 0.010
(1.548) (0.453) (0.836) (0.026)
Sponsor: Coup Risk 0.120
(1.211)
Post-1989 0.815*** 0.165 0.076 0.137
(2.811) (0.615) (0.312) (0.584)
Years since Orchestration 7.507*** 6.696*** 7.057*** 6.093***
(7.237) (7.173) (7.595) (6.636)
Years since Orchestration2 1.818*** 1.649*** 1.741*** 1.509***
(5.861) (5.688) (6.093) (5.346)
Years since Orchestration3 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.112***
(4.808) (4.584) (4.953) (4.384)
Constant 0.282 1.154 1.821 0.037
(0.166) (0.823) (1.359) (0.029)
AIC 446.120 545.549 592.408 665.811
BIC 524.931 621.302 664.741 739.017
Observations 762 841 918 973
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Before discussing the theoretical implications of these results, we explore the
substantive effect the independent variables have on the choice of support type. We
first compute first difference estimates for the variables of theoretical interest in
Model 1 and present them graphically in Figure 3. These indicate the change in the
predicted probability of orchestration given a one-unit change in the respective
variable of interest with all other variables being at their observed values. This
suggests that the strongest effect for a one-unit change is that of ethnic ties between
the sponsor and rebels as their existence makes orchestration 12.6 percent more
likely.13 In contrast, a rivalry between sponsor and target state decreases the like-
lihood of orchestration by 8.4 percent.
However, the number of rebel groups in a conflict and sponsors’ military cap-
abilities as measured by their military expenditures also have noticeable positive
effects on orchestration. While a one-unit change only increases its probability by
1.4 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, these are (semi-)continuous variables.
We thus graph the probability of orchestration over their respective full
ranges in Figure 4. There, it becomes clear that a shift of their full range of
empirical values is associated with an increase of 10.9 percent and almost 40.0
percent, respectively. However, confidence intervals for both variables are often
Figure 3. First estimates for model 1. Note: Discrete first differences computed from Model 1
(95 percent CIs) while holding all other variables at their observed values.






























































































































large due to few observations for a specific value, meaning that these point
estimates are relatively imprecise.
To sum up, our results corroborate our expectation that ethnic ties between the
sponsor and a rebel group, the number of rebel groups in a conflict, and a rivalry
between sponsor and target state are all significantly related to the sponsor’s chosen
mode of support. This is also the case for the sponsor’s capabilities. These signif-
icant relationships are substantively relevant as changes in all four variables are
associated with substantial shifts in the likelihood of orchestration. Finally, we
examine these variables’ relevance in terms of our model’s predictive out-of-
sample performance by running a fourfold cross-validation exercise (see Ward,
Greenhill, and Bakke 2010). Its results indicate that dropping any of the three
theoretically relevant variables from the full model diminishes its predictive
performance.14
Our results are also generally robust to several additional tests. Most importantly,
we address the potential selection stemming from the decision between orchestration
and delegation being hardly independent from a state’s decision on whether to
provide support to a given group in the first place. For instance, ethnic ties or an
international rivalry not only shape the type of support but also make the occurrence
of a support relationship more likely in the first place (see Saideman 1997, 2002;
Maoz and San-Akca 2012; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Saideman
2001). To tackle this, we first estimate selection models which model both the
decision to support and the decision between delegation and orchestration as inter-
linked stages within the same model. While the second stage takes orchestration as
the outcome variable and mirrors our main models in the choice of independent
variables, the first stage has the occurrence of support as dependent variable and a
parsimonious set of predictors previously shown to drive external sponsorship. We
present the results of a selection model including the same independent variables as
Model 1 in its second stage in Figure 5 and results tables for both this and additional
models as well as a more detailed discussion of these specifications in the Online
Appendix. The estimates mirror those of the main models, suggesting that selection
does not drive our results.
In the Online Appendix, we also employ matching as an alternative strategy to
address selection and again find results which are supportive of our expectations. We
also conduct several additional robustness checks. Given that a sponsor supports
more than one group in 30 percent of observations, we test how this affects our
findings, specifically that outside options increase the probability of orchestration.
Moreover, we examine whether the (co-)creation of a rebel group by a sponsor or
different aggregations of the dependent variable impact our substantive results. Our
findings remain unaffected. To check whether the choice of data source affects our
results, we use the Dangerous Companions Dataset (San-Akca 2016) to replicate our
results. While our theoretical model is generally supported by this exercise as the
effects of ethnic ties and rivalry are in line with our expectations, the number of rebel
groups does not achieve statistical significance. The results of these as well as
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further additional specifications are reported in the Online Appendix. Before we
summarize our contributions, the next section turns to two results that have impli-
cations for scholarship on indirect warfare and indirect governance more generally
and outlines avenues for future research.
Theoretical Implications
While the empirical analysis largely corroborated our theoretical model, two addi-
tional results also deserve particular consideration since these contradict recent
scholarship on indirect governance and rebel support: the positive effect of sponsors’
capabilities on the likelihood of orchestration; and the significant stability of spon-
sors’ choice between orchestration and delegation. In the following, we shortly
discuss these findings and offer preliminary interpretations that might provide a
starting point for future studies.
Firstly, we find that a sponsor’s capabilities make delegation less—not more—
likely. Our empirical analysis shows that a sponsors’ capabilities have a significant
positive effect on the likelihood of orchestration. In contrast, research on indirect
governance expects governors to compromise on hierarchical control when “a
Figure 5. First difference estimates of selection model. Note: Discrete first differences
computed from Online Appendix Model A1 (95 percent CIs) while holding all other variables
at their observed values.
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governor lacks the authority or resources to exercise hard controls.” (Abbott et al.
2020a, 624) The underlying assumption is that “weak governments often have little
alternative to orchestration” (Abbott et al. 2020a, 624). Similarly, existing scholar-
ship on rebel support assumes—in line with PA Theory—that a support relationship
only lacks strong control if the sponsor falls short of the necessary capabilities to
exercise it (Byman and Kreps 2010, 9; Salehyan 2010, 505; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and
Cunningham 2011, 711).
Our results imply that sponsors’ greater capabilities—besides goal alignment and
competition—might render “hands-on” control expendable. Compared to weaker
states, great powers are in a better position to afford efficiency losses due to rebels’
partially non-compliant behavior. At the same time, the risks of delegation—losing
local legitimacy and domestic or international backlash—are independent from a
sponsor’s capabilities. Powerful states might thus accept the inefficient use of their
resources while tapping into the benefits of orchestration as the utility exceeds its
relative costs. Powerful states might also be less concerned about rebels turning
against them (see Bapat 2012). Finally, great powers might be in an advantaged
position to weaker states as their overall power projection capabilities render the
threat of sanctions more credible than those of weaker states. Powerful sponsors can
thus orchestrate rebels in a regional or even global “shadow of hierarchy” which
substitutes “hands-on” control instruments (cf. Miller 2005, 210). Sponsors with
greater capabilities might be generally more able and willing to tap into the benefits
of “hands-off” orchestration.
Secondly, we find that sponsors’ choice between orchestration and delegation is
significantly stable—and not unstable—over time. Figure 6 presents the effect of
years since last orchestration on the probability of a support relationship being
orchestrated based on the cubic polynomials of time from Model 1. It shows how
the probability of orchestration changes depending on whether a support relationship
was previously inactive or orchestrated (Years since Orchestration¼ 1) or delegated
(Years since Orchestration > 1). Figure 6 indicates that the mode of support is
remarkably stable. We thus observe a very low probability of a support relationship
to change its mode to orchestration when delegation took place in the year before,
and vice versa. In other words, while sponsors might change the level of support
provided to rebels within a given support mode, they tend to stick to their initially
chosen mode of indirect governance. This observed stability of a sponsor’s choice
between orchestration and delegation presents a challenge to recent scholarship on
indirect governance which expects that indirect governance relationships are char-
acterized by “endogenous instabilities” that “can upset the balance on which the
initial choice of governance mode was based, leading to dissatisfaction, modifica-
tions within modes, shifts between modes, or the complete breakdown of indirect
governance” (Abbott et al. 2020a, 629).
Path-dependence might thus be at work within the two modes of indirect war.
Indeed, historical-institutionalist approaches would suggest that governance
arrangements are characterized by endogenous stability over time due to increasing
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returns, socialization, and other positive feedback effects (see, Hall and Taylor 1996;
Pierson 2004; Fioretos 2011; Weiss and Heinkelmann-Wild 2020). For instance, in
delegation relationships, a rebel group might, over time, specialize its income to the
sponsor’s support while losing support among the local population. While this is
effective in terms of financing, a lack of local legitimacy, in turn, renders switching
to orchestration unattractive for the sponsor. Furthermore, given the visibility of
delegation, it might be politically costly for a sponsor to back down from publicly
supporting a rebel group as this would signal weakness and a lack of commitment
(Bapat 2012). Moreover, as orchestration allows rebels to increase their independent
capabilities and gain leverage vis-à-vis their sponsor, it gets more and more difficult
for the governor to impose hierarchical control on them (see also, Abbott et al.
2020a, 2020b). So even if rebels use these increased capabilities to pursue their own
goals, sponsors might prefer to either live with some non-compliance by their
intermediary and continue enjoying the benefits of orchestration (or to end the
support relationship) instead of shifting from orchestration to delegation.
In this paper, we introduced an indirect governance perspective to explain spon-
sors’ choice between support modes. However, this can only constitute a first step
towards understanding the dynamics of indirect governance in rebel support. Future
research could add complexity to our parsimonious model of the drivers of orches-
tration and delegation. Future studies could unpack the time-dependent dynamics of
Figure 6. The effect of time since last orchestration on orchestration. Note: Predicted
probabilities computed from Model 1 (95 percent CIs) while holding all other variables at their
observed values.
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indirect warfare and examine why sponsors often stick to their initial support mode.
Do support relationships constitute efficient equilibria or are other mechanisms at
work that reinforce the chosen mode of support (see, e.g., Weiss and Heinkelmann-
Wild 2020)? Moreover, while our paper focused on the control opportunities enabled
or constrained by different support types, future research could examine how pow-
erful states’ capacities allow them to issue credible threats to induce rebels’ com-
pliance while tapping into the benefits of “hands-off” orchestration. In addition,
future studies could also assess how different rebel group characteristics affect
support modes.15 As San-Akca (2017) has demonstrated that rebels are not simply
passive receivers of support, but can actively shape support relationships, rebels
might, for instance, choose to reject specific types of support—and the attached
strings (see also, Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Bapat
2012). Are rebels more likely to reject “hands-on” delegation than “hands-off”
orchestration? Furthermore, a rebel group’s fragmentation might also impact state
sponsors’ choice of support mode. Rebel group fragmentation was demonstrated to
induce information and commitment problems, rendering such groups more difficult
bargaining partners but also more likely to obtain concessions (K. G. Cunningham
2011, 2013, 2014). Fragmentation might provide sponsors the possibility to manage
rebels by an intra-group competition mechanism as they can (threaten to) shift
resources to factions if the leadership fails to comply (Tamm 2016). Future research
might therefore study whether fragmented groups are more or less likely to receive
support without “hands-on” control attached.
Future research could also examine the consequences of orchestration and dele-
gation. Future studies could empirically test our theoretical assumptions underlying
the conceptual distinction between “hands-off” orchestration and “hands-on” dele-
gation (see, e.g., Mehrl and Heinkelmann-Wild 2020). Does “hands-on” delegation
render rebels’ non-compliance less likely? Does “hands-on” delegation lead to
increased efforts on the battlefield while “hands-off” orchestration leads rebels to
redeploy resources to other objectives besides defeating the target state? Does
“hands-off” orchestration shield state sponsors from domestic and international
backlash? Does “hands-on” delegation harm rebels’ local legitimacy while
“hands-off” orchestration leaves it intact or even increases it?
Finally, future researcher could unpack the indirect governance chain by not only
considering the relationship between the state sponsor and the rebels, but also the
relationship between rebel leadership and their soldiers (see, e.g., Weinstein 2005;
Hoover Green 2016) as well as interactions between the different links in this chain
(see, e.g., Mehrl 2020, 2021). Future studies could also examine the impact of
support modes on group cohesion (see also, Tamm 2016; K. G. Cunningham
2013). Does “hands-off” orchestration provide leadership advantages or disadvan-
tages vis-à-vis their soldiers, and thus affect fragmentation? Such studies might then
consider feedback effects between rebels’ internal group dynamics and their rela-
tionship with state sponsors.
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Overall, while there are ample avenues along which future research can build on
and add to our model of indirect governance at war, our key message stands that
scholarship on indirect warfare should account for state sponsors’ diverging control
opportunities over rebel groups and that more control is not always the preferable
option.
Conclusion
In this paper, we theoretically developed and empirically tested a model of indirect
governance at war. Drawing on recent scholarship on indirect governance, we sug-
gested differentiating two modes of support relationships in indirect wars: delega-
tion, which allows for the “hands-on” control of rebels’ compliance but tends to
harm their local legitimacy and to attract responsibility attributions to the sponsor;
and “hands-off” orchestration, which allows sponsors to tap into rebels’ local legiti-
macy and enjoy plausible deniability, but diminishes their opportunities to detect
and enforce rebels’ compliance. This trade-off then shapes sponsors’ choice between
the two modes. Sponsors prefer orchestration when a lack of hierarchical control is
alleviated by the availability of a rebel group with shared ethnic ties (goal alignment
thesis) or alternative rebel groups (supply thesis). Sponsors prefer delegation when
the conflict is highly salient for them due to long-term rivalry with the targeted state
(saliency thesis). The empirical analysis corroborated our model of indirect warfare.
As expected, orchestration is more likely to be chosen when the sponsor and the
rebel group share ethnic ties and the supply of potential receivers is high. In contrast,
we do find some evidence that supporters are more likely to invest in hierarchical
control when a conflict is highly salient as implied by the existence of a long-term
rivalry, but these results lack robustness.
Our paper contributes to both scholarship on indirect governance as well as rebel
support. Conceptually, we go beyond the rebel support literature’s focus on delega-
tion by differentiating between orchestration and delegation. This avoids the risk of
overstretching the delegation concept and allows analyzing sponsors’ choice
between different support modes. Moreover, the conceptual distinction between
orchestration and delegation might offer a fruitful theoretical foundation for recent
studies that explore the varying consequences of different forms of rebel support and
financing (Karlén 2017; Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017; Belgioiso 2018;
Haer, Faulkner, and Whitaker 2020). Theoretically, we introduce the indirect gov-
ernance perspective to peace and conflict studies to explain sponsors’ choice
between support modes.16 Empirically, our paper thereby puts the indirect govern-
ance framework to a statistical test. While our theoretical model is largely corrobo-
rated by the analysis, we also made two observations that deviate from common
expectations: a sponsor’s capabilities make delegation less (not more) likely; and
sponsors’ choice between orchestration and delegation is stable (and not unstable)
over time. These insights might inspire further theorizing on the drivers and
dynamics of indirect governance.
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Notes
1. For the purpose of this paper, we define indirect warfare as instances where a third-party
government (i.e., the sponsor) intentionally supports a rebel group (i.e., the receiver) in its
fight against its government (i.e., the target) (see Loveman 2002, 30; Salehyan 2010, 494;
Mumford 2013, 11). As our focus is on intentional support, for the purposes of this paper,
indirect warfare does not include unintentional forms of “de facto” support, that is,
instances where rebel groups operate within a third-party state without that state’s knowl-
edge or acquiescence such (San-Akca 2016).
2. We take the terms orchestration and delegation from the literature on indirect governance,
where delegation refers to hard-controlled, hierarchical relationships and orchestration to
soft-controlled relationships between a governor and an intermediary (Abbott et al. 2016,
2020a, 2020b).
3. Our focus is on how support types constrain or enable control. We therefore assume that
state sponsors will take advantage of the control opportunities posed by the respective
support types.
4. To be sure, we do not claim that orchestration is the main driver of a rebel group’s local
legitimacy, which is shaped, inter alia, by whether a rebel group extracts resources from
the population and mistreats civilians, or provides social services to them (see, e.g., Flynn
and Stewart 2018; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013). We suggest that, all else equal, “hands-
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off” orchestration is less likely to create the impression of being a foreign power’s puppet
(see also, Tamm 2020). This not only allows the rebel group to foster its legitimacy by
using the received support to succeed in its fight against the target government, but, in the
absence of “hands-on” control, also to redeploy it to its own purposes by distributing
money or goods among the local population (see Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017).
5. This parallels with insights from scholarship on the relationship between the rebel lead-
ership and their soldiers, which inter alia examines how rebel leaders screen recruits
(Weinstein 2005) and maintain control over their rank-and-file membership (Hoover
Green 2016).
6. While among the other rebel groups in a conflict some might adhere to an ideology or
pursue goals which diverge from those of the sponsor, rendering them a less attractive and
plausible outside option, we hold that a common enemy (i.e., the target government) is
sufficient for rebels and a state sponsor to potentially enter into a support relationship. For
instance, both Greece and Iran have provided support to the PKK’s fight against the Turkish
government but are unlikely to have had much sympathy for the group’s leftist ideology or
a significant interest in the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state, especially as Iran
itself has been facing an insurgency by the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.
7. Publicly known support relationships to rebel groups may even be meant as signaling
credible commitment to a political cause as argued by Bapat (2012) with regards to the
Iranian government’s support of Hamas.
8. This support type mainly comprises the transfer of “non-weaponry and non-munition
supplies that [ . . . ] serve direct military purposes” (Croicu et al. 2011, 16).
9. Relationships involving POLISARIO were originally counted twice for the years 1976 to
1978 due to POLISARIO fighting both Morocco and Mauritania. To avoid double-
counts, we dropped the Mauritanian cases as the conflict with Morocco was the more
durable one. In twenty-one instances, it was impossible to code a support dyad as it
included only support of an unknown or other type.
10. We account for the TSCS structure of our data in two ways. We set observations of
orchestration that do not mark the onset of a previously inactive support relationship or a
change in its type to missing because we want to examine why some sponsors choose one
type of support instead of the other—and the reasons for doing so may be different from
leaving the support mode unchanged (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; McGrath 2015).
Moreover, we account for time dependency by including cubic polynomials of the time
between the last Orchestration event and the current observation (Carter and Signorino
2010) and cluster standard errors on the support-dyad.
11. Summary statistics are reported in the Online Appendix.
12. This implies that while dropping coup risk, rivalry, and the number of rebel groups
increases the sample size and temporal coverage of our models, it also reduces model
quality.
13. This effect is conditioned, but always positive and significant, by direct contiguity
between sponsor and target state. Ethnic ties increase the probability of orchestration
by 10.1 percent if these states are contiguous (n ¼ 152) and by 20.1 percent (n ¼ 61) if
they are not (see Online Appendix).
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14. Table A.2. in the Online Appendix shows the AUC values for all models.
15. On different types of intermediaries in indirect governance, see Abbott et al. (2021) and
Jankauskas (2021).
16. Recent contributions have also adopted an indirect governance perspective to study cases
of governments’ use of militias (Salehyan 2020) and invaders’ use of private security
companies (Kruck 2020) or local rebels (Tamm 2020) in conflict settings.
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